My research set out to determine what impact power sharing and partition have on the legitimacy of post-conflict arrangements in a country following either an ideological or ethnic civil war. Although more research is necessary to test my theory in full, this study helps to advance the existing literature by matriculating from past examinations which have merely looked at which of the respective methods of conflict management are most associated with durable peace to studying how these methods achieve that end or why they fail to do so. Furthermore, by examining legitimacy as a factor in determining whether conflict will recur, this project provides some policy implications that cannot be found in past literature focusing on less mutable characteristics. The lack of findings to evidence a significant relationship between partition and the legitimacy of post conflict arrangements in cases of either ethnic or ideological civil war suggest that it may not be an effective tool for the consolidation of peace durability. When partition is used as a method of conflict management, decision makers should primarily focus their efforts on improving enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, as power sharing shows no significant implications for the legitimacy of arrangements following ethnic conflict, decision makers attempting to use power sharing as a method of conflict management following an ethnic conflict should invest more in the establishment of effective enforcement mechanisms. However, since power sharing demonstrates some promise for promoting legitimacy following ideological conflicts, further research should be conducted to explore in greater detail the relationship between power sharing of the institutional arrangements during a post-conflict period.
However, this study leaves room for future research. Alternative measures of legitimacy should be tested and research should be conducted examining the implications that partition and power sharing institutions have on the enforceability of post-conflict arrangements. Future studies should also expand upon the theory by analyzing specific provision types most conducive to improved measures of legitimacy and enforceability. For example, one might ask whether power sharing institutions should include provisions primarily focused with military as opposed to political power sharing. To make this determination, a study must look at not only the presence or absence of power sharing measures or partition but the nature of those institutions. Thus, although this project provides a theoretical stepping stone for the advancement of existing literature, further work is neccesary to further explore this avenue.